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The Walking Dead or Weekend at Bernie’s? 
How the Public Trust Doctrine Threatens 
Alternative Energy Development 
 




 One of the oldest doctrines of environmental law, the public trust 
doctrine, is sufficiently ambiguous that it risks threatening widespread 
adoptions of alternative energy sources such as wind energy. Because of 
this, the public trust doctrine threatens the protection of the environment in 
the name of protection of the environment. Yet, the public trust doctrine and 
future energy policy should be complementary and not exclusionary of each 
other. In light of this, whether an agency has public trust authority should 
be determined based on six factors: the legal authority of state fiduciaries; 
due diligence by state fiduciaries in determining if actions are in the public 
interest; state fiduciaries’ responsibility to mitigate harm; state fiduciaries’ 
responsibility to manage protected resources and uses; state action that 
risks or causes substantial harm to a protected resource must be 
outweighed by the benefits to the entire State’s resources; and State action 
that risks or causes substantial harm to a protected public use must be 
outweighed by the benefits to protected resources or the public interest. 
Without significant change to environmental laws, particularly the public 
trust doctrine, environmental law runs the risk of ceasing to become a 
coherent body of law. 
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I. Introduction 
In The Walking Dead,1 humans come back to life as zombies. In 
Weekend at Bernie’s,2 two employees prop up their dead boss Bernie to 
make him appear alive. Many consider the public trust doctrine analogous 
to a zombie, resurrected from Ancient Rome and the Middle Ages to 
protect coasts and offshore waters for current and future citizens.3 However, 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See THE WALKING DEAD (Image Comics), available at 
http://imagecomics.com/comics/series/the-walking-dead; The Walking Dead (AMC 
television series). 
 2. WEEKEND AT BERNIE’S (Gladden Entertainment 1989). 
 3. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) (characterizing public trust as 
deriving from Roman and English law); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign 
Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations 
(Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 68 (2009) 
(“The public trust is perpetual, designed by courts to secure the natural resources needed by 
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until courts resolve the doctrine’s ambiguity, Bernie is the better analogy.4 
Courts adopted the public trust doctrine from Roman and English 
law in the nineteenth century.5 The doctrine obligates states to protect 
coastal and offshore waters for public benefit.6 Courts, however, provide 
little guidance beyond this vague definition.7 As a seminal public trust 
theorist noted, “[t]he ‘public trust’ has no life of its own and no intrinsic 
content.”8 Rather, it is “a mixture of ideas which have floated rather freely. 
The ideas are of several kinds and they have received inconsistent 
treatment . . . [by courts].”9 
The doctrine’s ambiguity allowed states to define the doctrine to 
suit specific needs.10 Application of the doctrine to alternative energy 
development renders multiple conflicting answers,11 suggesting the 
ambiguity is a symptom of emptiness, not versatility. 
An overabundance of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
ocean threaten the world’s resources.12 This overabundance particularly 
                                                                                                                 
both present and future generations.”). 
 4. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public 
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 803 
(2004) (“A number of serious ambiguities afflict this doctrine.”). 
 5. See Sax, supra note 3, at 475–76 (citing W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN 
LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN, 182–85 (2d ed. 1932)) (indicating property rights in 
rivers, seas, and the seashore as areas of attention within Roman and English law). 
 6. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (characterizing the trust as 
requiring the state to protect waters for the public); Sax, supra note 3, at 556–57 (including 
all land below the water mark within the scope of the trust). 
 7. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 454 (“General language sometimes found in 
opinions of the courts, expressive of absolute ownership and control by the State of lands 
under navigable waters, irrespective of any trust as to their use and disposition, must be read 
and construed with reference to the special facts of the particular cases.”); see also Sax, 
supra note 3, at 476–77 (“Whether and to what extent that trusteeship [under the public trust 
doctrine] constrains the states in their dealings with such lands has . . . been a subject of 
much controversy.”). 
 8. Sax, supra note 3, at 521. 
 9. Id. at 484. 
 10. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[I]t has been 
long established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands 
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”); Robin 
Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrine States, Property 
Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10‒14 (2007–08) (recognizing 
differences in focus and scope among states when applying the public trust doctrine). 
 11. See Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1040, 1053–58, 1061–63 (2011) (stating that conflicts between 
renewable energy projects, such as solar and wind, and the public trust doctrine are 
inevitable). 
 12. See Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean 
Acidification (and Why They Should), 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 58 (2013) (“[A] more 
acidic ocean has begun to dissolve the shells and other hard parts of marine organisms and 
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threatens coastlines and offshore waters,13 areas that are protected by the 
public trust doctrine.14 Most greenhouse gas emissions result from the 
production and use of fossil fuels.15 To mitigate harm, many coastal states 
are pursuing alternative energy sources, including offshore wind farms.16 
 Offshore wind energy offers long-term benefits, but it also imposes 
short-term harm.17 The harm, though minimal relative to the harm imposed 
by fossil fuels, implicates the public trust doctrine.18 The doctrine’s 
ambiguity makes it unclear how courts should apply it to offshore wind 
energy.19 This article argues that such indeterminacy undermines alternative 
energy development and harms the public interest. 
Part II presents adoption and subsequent interpretation of the public 
                                                                                                                 
threatens to change fundamentally the marine ecosystems on which a large fraction of the 
world depends for sustenance, recreation, and a host of other services.”); Susan Solomon et 
al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NATL. ACAD. 
SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (identifying increases in heavy rainfall and flooding, permafrost 
melt, loss of glaciers and snowpack, and increased intensity of hurricanes as possible 
consequences of higher carbon dioxide levels). 
 13. See Solomon et al., supra note 12, at 1708 (noting that rising sea levels could 
affect coastlines). 
 14. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 
N.E.2d 787, 800 (Mass. 2010) (describing the established principle that the public trust 
doctrine protects tidelands for both fishing and navigation, among other uses). 
 15. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) 
(noting that in 2011, thirty-three percent of greenhouse gas emissions resulted from 
electricity production, twenty-eight percent resulted from transportation, twenty percent 
resulted from industry, eleven percent resulted from commercial and residential sectors, of 
which the burning of fossil fuels was the primary source in each of these sources) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 16. See MICHAEL HAHN & PATRICK GILMAN, NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC. FOR U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFSHORE WIND MARKET AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7 tbl. 1–2 (2013), 
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/offshore_wind_market_and 
_economic_analysis_10_2013.pdf (describing advanced-stage offshore wind energy 
projects) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 17. See Environmental Impacts and Siting of Wind Projects, DEPT. OF ENERGY, 
http://energy.gov/eere/wind/environmental-impacts-and-siting-wind-projects (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2014) (“Wind projects have the potential to reduce, fragment, or degrade habitat for 
wildlife, fish, and plants. Turbine blades and towers can pose a threat to flying wildlife like 
birds . . . and bats.”). 
 18. See Klass, supra note 11, at 1024 (“This focus on the role of renewable energy in 
addressing climate change, energy independence, and environmental protection . . . has 
direct ties to the public trust doctrine.”); see also Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 
N.E.2d at 800 (“There is no question that the Commonwealth tidelands through which Cape 
Wind’s transmission lines will pass are held in the public trust . . . .”). 
 19. See Klass, supra note 11, at 1024–25 (describing arguments that offshore 
renewable energy projects are both consistent and inconsistent with the public trust 
doctrine). 
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trust doctrine in the United States Part III explores alternative energy 
development, the first federally-approved offshore wind energy project, and 
a public trust challenge that the project faced. Part IV identifies major areas 
of indeterminacy in public trust law. Part V suggests how courts should 
make the doctrine more reliable. This article concludes in Part VI by 
arguing that ambiguity in the public trust doctrine represents larger 
paradigmatic problems in environmental law. 
 
II. Public Trust Doctrine 
 
The public trust doctrine creates an enforceable fiduciary 
relationship between state trustees and citizen beneficiaries.20 As 
fiduciaries, states must hold coasts and offshore waters in trust for the 
benefit of their citizens.21 Beyond this abstract definition, courts do not 
provide guidelines for states administering the trust. With only minimal 
limits, courts allow states to define the purpose and scope of their public 
trust doctrine.22 
 
A.  Adopting the Public Trust 
 
The public trust notion originated in sixth century Rome.23 Roman 
Emperor Justinian ordered the writing of the Institutes, a series of quasi-
legal codes.24 Book II of the Institutes included the passage: 
 
Thus, the following things are by natural law common 
all—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the 
sea-shore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (describing the public trust as “that trust which 
requires the government of the state to preserve such [navigable] waters for the use of the 
public” and which “can only be discharged by the management and control of property in 
which the public has an interest”). 
 21. See id. at 452 (“[Coastal areas are] held in trust for the people of the state, that 
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty 
of fishing therein . . . .”); Sax, supra note 3, at 474 n.14 (“[I]n many traditional public trust 
cases, the state was the plaintiff, and the defendant was a private landowner, a local 
government, or a public agency.”). 
 22. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475 (“[I]t has been long established that the 
individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public 
trust . . . .”); Craig, supra note 10, at 10–14 (identifying the different applications of the 
common law tidal test by different jurisdictions). 
 23. See Sax, supra note 3, at 475‒76 (discussing the flexibility that states have in 
devising the public trust). 
 24. See WILLIAM A. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 17 (4th ed. 1880) 
(discussing the creation of the Institutes). 
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seashore, provided he abstains from injury to houses, 
monuments, and buildings generally . . . . [A]ll rivers and 
harbours are public, so that all persons have a right to fish 
therein.25 
 
Although the Roman notion was only quasi-legal, it heavily 
influenced thirteenth century English law.26 The English public trust 
doctrine restrained the Crown from “granting exclusive rights to hunt or 
fish,” and “obligated the king to protect tidal waters and shorelines for 
public use.”27 
U.S. courts adopted the public trust doctrine from the English 
common law in the early nineteenth century.28 In Arnold v. Mundy,29 the 
plaintiff held exclusive title to an oyster bed, and sued the defendant for 
trespass.30 The court concluded that the public trust doctrine required New 
Jersey to hold protected areas in trust for public use.31 Thus, the state could 
not grant exclusive use of an oyster bed, and the plaintiff’s title did not 
include the right to exclude others.32 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Arnold’s reasoning in Illinois 
Central Railroad v. Illinois.33 The Illinois legislature had granted most of 
the Chicago waterfront to a railroad company.34 When the legislature later 
repealed the statute, the railroad sued for enforcement of the grant.35 The 
Court said that the public trust doctrine bound all states to hold protected 
                                                                                                                           
 25. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES book II, tit. 1, §§ 1–2 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford 1911), 
available at http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/digital/CJCiv/JInst.pdf (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 26. See Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 447, 482 (1960) (“Chancellors availed themselves of Roman rules in the construction 
of legacies and documents.”). 
 27. See Sax, supra note 3, at 476 (discussing the limits that the doctrine placed on the 
Crown). 
 28. See Arnold v. Mundy 6 N.J.L. 1, 12–13 (N.J. 1821) (identifying the English rights 
that were brought to the United States). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 9 (“The action is for a trespass in entering upon the plaintiff’s oyster bed, 
and taking and carrying away his oysters.”). 
 31. See id. at 7–8 (“The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the 
principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct 
and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common 
right.”). 
 32. See id. (“[T]he grant in question is void, and ought not to prevail for the benefit of 
the plaintiff, and, of course, that the rule to shew cause must be discharged.”). 
 33. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 34. See id. at 439 (noting the land granted to the railroad included both the bed of 
Lake Michigan and the harbor). 
 35. See id. at 449 (reciting the facts of the case). 
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areas in trust for public use.36 Specifically, the trust placed two restrictions 
on state trustees. First, states cannot grant an entire protected area if the 
grant interferes with “navigation of the waters . . . commerce over them, 
and . . . liberty [to fish] therein freed from the obstruction or interference of 
private parties.”37 Secondly, states cannot abdicate their duty to manage the 
protected resource.38 Beyond these abstract limits, the Court has said little. 
 
B.  Interpreting the Public Trust 
 
Legal scholars have attempted to give substance to the doctrine, but 
much work remains.39 Professor Joseph Sax’s scholarship is particularly 
influential.40 As he noted: 
 
[T]here is no well-conceived doctrinal basis that supports a 
theory under which interests are entitled to special judicial 
attention and protection. Rather, there is a mixture of ideas 
which have floated rather freely in and out of American 
public trust law. The ideas are of several kinds and they 
have received inconsistent treatment in the law.41 
 
Sax sought to find a coherent doctrine within disparate state 
interpretations. He concluded that the doctrine requires courts to examine 
resource reallocations if the democratic process is inadequate, public uses 
are restricted, or if the trust is subject to private interests.42 Sax offers a 
more precise definition than Illinois Central, but he similarly declined to 
describe specific trustee duties. 
After Illinois Central, states applied the doctrine in various ways,43 
                                                                                                                           
 36. See id. at 435 (stating that under the law it is settled that “lands covered by tide 
waters” belong to the states, and cannot be used in way that substantially impairs the public's 
use of such lands). 
 37. Id. at 452. 
 38. See id. at 453 (“Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust 
which requires the government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the 
public.”). 
 39. See Sax, supra note 3, at 473–74 (discussing areas of the law that remain 
unsettled). 
 40. See James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the 
Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 565, 566 (1986) (“The rebirth and dramatic growth of the public trust doctrine is in no 
small part the product of a classic article on the subject by Joseph Sax.”). 
 41. Sax, supra note 3, at 484. 
 42. See id. at 557–65 (outlining an analytical framework with which courts should 
analyze public trust issues). 
 43. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ 
Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
 
336 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 329 (2014) 
a practice that state high courts have affirmed.44 Among others, expanded 
areas of protection include inland wetlands and parks, municipal water 
supplies, streets, and prehistoric fossil beds.45 Expanded public uses include 
aesthetic enjoyment, recreational activities, and wildlife protection.46 
In Center for Biology Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc.,47 the California 
Court of Appeals said that wildlife is a public trust resource.48 Most court 
language suggests wildlife is more akin to a protected use than a protected 
resource. In Arnold, “the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts,” were “placed in 
the hands of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and regulated for 
the common use and benefit.”49 In Smith v. Maryland,50 the Supreme Court 
held that resources were in trust “for . . . the enjoyment of certain public 
rights, among which is [fishing].”51 
The ability of the doctrine to expand its scope of protection is often 
considered a public good, but there are risks.52 As Huffman noted: 
 
The [initial] concept of a public right to navigation, 
commerce and fishing in navigable waters is bounded 
sufficiently to limit the discretion of a judge or other public 
official. To be sure there are gray areas where judgment 
must be exercised . . . . But if a public right to fish implies 
a public right to camp and a navigable waterway implies a 
prairie pothole, or if the concept of a public right in 
navigation, commerce and fishing implies a public right in 
                                                                                                                 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (presenting the different ways that 
states have shaped the public trust doctrine). 
 44. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
54 (N.J. 1972) (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions 
and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”). 
 45.  See id. at 48 (applying the public trust doctrine to the use of a beach). 
 46. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 34–35 
(Lewis and Clark Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, 2012) (arguing for the 
increased application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife issues). 
 47. 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 48. See id. at 591 (“Wildlife . . . is considered to be a public trust resource of all the 
people of the state, and private parties have the right to bring an action to enforce the public 
trust.”). 
 49. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 46, at 22 (discussing the Arnold decision). 
 50. 59 U.S. 71 (1855). 
 51. Id. at 72. 
 52. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 96 (2008) (arguing that expanding the 
scope of the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries would make it 
indistinguishable from a state’s traditional police powers). 
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all things . . . then there can be no rule of law . . . .53 
 
III. Offshore Wind Energy Development 
 
A.  Fossil Fuels and Climate Change 
 
An overabundance of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
ocean threatens coastlines and offshore waters, areas protected by the public 
trust doctrine.54 This overabundance causes the disruption of climate 
patterns, heavier rainfall, the alteration of river flows, changes in the 
temperature and chemistry of the ocean, and higher sea levels which 
threaten barrier islands, coastal marshes, and wildlife.55 
The burning of fossil fuels for energy accounts for most of the 
United States’ greenhouse gas emissions.56 To mitigate harm caused by 
fossil fuels, states are pursuing alternative energy.57 Alternative energy, 
however, imposes its own harms, implicating environmental laws.58 
Offshore wind is a promising source of alternative energy.59 While the 
United States does not yet have commercial-scale offshore wind capacity, 
Massachusetts and Texas lead a number of coastal states pursuing 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Id. 
 54. See Solomon et al., supra note 12, at 1708 (“Sea level rise can be expected to 
affect many coastal regions.”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 
(1892) (discussing the common law that “lands under tide waters” belong to the public 
trust). 
 55. See generally Kelly & Caldwell, supra note 12 (discussing the impacts that 
increases in greenhouse gases have on the oceans); see also Solomon et al., supra note 12 
(discussing the effects of carbon emissions on the oceans). 
 56. See Kelly & Caldwell, supra note 12, at 100 (explaining some sources of the 
United States’ emissions). 
 57. See Lori Bird et al., Policies and Market Factors Driving Wind Power 
Development in the United States, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 1397, 1397–1400 (2005) (exploring the 
growth of wind energy investment in the United States); see also Klass, supra note 11, at 
1024 (“In recent years, efforts to develop large-scale wind, solar, and other renewable 
energy projects in the United States have grown exponentially. . . . The rhetoric surrounding 
renewable energy focuses on . . . environmental protection . . . and the need to create sources 
of sustainable energy . . . .”). 
 58. See John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 73 (2013) (“Renewable energy is most touted for its environmental 
benefits, yet environmental laws pose one of the most significant obstacles to developing 
renewable energy.”). 
 59. See WALTER MUSIAL & BONNIE RAM, LARGE-SCALE OFFSHORE WIND POWER IN 
THE UNITED STATES: ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.osti.gov/greenenergy/rddetail?osti_id=990101 (“Overall, the opportunities for 
offshore wind are abundant . . . .”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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significant wind farms.60 
Developers often site offshore wind projects in federal waters.61 
Nonetheless, transmission lines travel through state waters, requiring state 
approval.62 Turbine rotors can reach over 400 feet high and spin nearly 170 
miles an hour, harming bird and bat populations.63 Offshore wind energy 
development can also interfere with navigation lanes, fishing and 
recreational areas, marine habitats, and other public trust protections.64 
As Craig observed: 
 
States’ overall public trust philosophies . . . vary widely, 
both rhetorically and in application . . . . As one obvious 
example, climate change effects threaten coasts throughout 
the United States. In light of such changes, coastal states 
viewing their public trust doctrines as evolutionary 
may . . . decide that the public trust doctrine gives the state 
extensive authority . . . [to protect] the coast. Alternatively 
. . . states may . . . [provide] greater protections to marine 
species and marine ecosystems.65 
 
B.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. 
 
Cape Wind was the first federally approved commercial-scale 
offshore wind energy project.66 Its regulatory path was uncertain and no 
substantial legal opposition was expected.67 Developers “invested over $40 
                                                                                                                           
 60. See Klass, supra note 11, at 1035–36 (discussing current efforts to site offshore 
wind farms off the Atlantic Coast). 
 61. See id. (stating that current efforts to site offshore wind projects focus on federal 
submerged lands). 
 62. See id. at 1050 (explaining that offshore projects require transmission lines 
throughout state, not federal waters). 
 63. See Dina Cappiello, Study: Wind Farms Killed 67 Eagles in 5 Years, THE BIG 
STORY (Sept. 11, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/study-wind-farms-killed-67-eagles-5-
years (citing a scientific study that states that wind energy facilities have killed at least sixty-
seven bald and golden eagles in the last five years) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 64. See Brian Snyder & Mark J. Kaiser, Ecological and Economic Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Offshore Wind Energy, 34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1567, 1568 (2009) (listing 
criticisms of offshore wind energy facilities); see also Bonnie Ram, Assessing Integrated 
Risks of Offshore Wind Projects: Moving Towards Gigawatt-Scale Deployments, 35 WIND 
ENG’G 247, 252–53 (2011) (discussing the risks that need to be considered when planning a 
wind energy project). 
 65. Craig, supra note 10, at 25. 
 66. See Klass, supra note 11, at 1050 (“The Cape Wind project . . . received the first 
federal offshore wind project lease in 2010 . . . .”). 
 67. See id. at 1053–59 (tracing the regulatory and legal history of the development of 
 
THE WALKING DEAD OR WEEKEND AT BERNIE’S? 339 
 
million and pursued the necessary permits for almost ten years.” 68 
When completed, Cape Wind will have 130 wind turbines in 
Nantucket Sound, five miles off the Massachusetts coast.69 The project will 
supply about seventy-five percent of the electricity for Cape Cod and the 
islands of Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard.70 Wind speeds in Nantucket 
Sound are high, averaging 19.75 miles an hour, and are highest during peak 
energy demand.71 The project site is barely visible from the shore, and does 
not interfere with commercial fishing, rare wildlife, or navigation.72 
Nevertheless, Cape Wind has fought opposition for a decade, mainly from 
the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (“the Alliance”).73 The Alliance 
spent $15 million or more opposing the project, including ten lawsuits 
challenging federal and state approvals.74 
The Cape Wind proposal sited the wind farm in federal waters, with 
transmission lines running under the seabed of Nantucket Sound and Lewis 
Bay.75 Thus, the project required federal, state, and local approval.76 The 
transmission cables are “indistinguishable from other cables in the same 
area” and cause no harm to the environment.77 Yet in 2007, the Cape Cod 
Commission denied the construction permit.78 After the Commission’s 
denial, Cape Wind applied to the siting board for a state permit that would 
supersede the local commission’s denial.79 After a hearing, the siting board 
                                                                                                                 
the Cape Wind project). 
 68. Kenneth Kimmell & Dawn Stolfi Stalenhoef, The Cape Wind Offshore Wind 
Energy Project: A Case Study of the Difficult Transition to Renewable Energy, 5 GOLDEN 
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2011). 
 69. See Frequently Asked Questions, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/FAQ-
Category4-Cape+Wind+Basics-Parent0-myfaq-yes.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (providing 
details about the Cape Wind project parameters) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 70. See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 68, at 200–01 (describing the Cape Wind 
project). 
 71. See id. (“The wind speeds in Nantucket Sound are high, averaging 19.75 miles per 
hour (mph), . . . ‘outstanding’ from a technical perspective. . . . Moreover, the wind blows 
strongest in Nantucket Sound at precisely the times of peak energy demand . . . .”). 
 72. See id. (noting the location of the Cape Wind project). 
 73. See id. at 201–02 (discussing opposition to the Cape Wind project). 
 74. See id. (noting the extent to which the Alliance opposed the Cape Wind project). 
 75. See id. at 222 (discussing the legal ramifications of the Cape Wind project’s 
location). 
 76. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 
N.E.2d 787, 793 (Mass. 2010) (describing the federal, state, and local approvals needed for 
the Cape Wind project to proceed). 
 77. Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 68, at 207. 
 78. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc., 932 N.E.2d at 794 (noting the 
Commission’s denial of the construction permit). 
 79. See id. at 795 (describing Cape Wind’s actions following the denial of the 
construction permit). 
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granted the superseding permit.80 The Alliance sued the siting board, 
arguing the board did not have authority under the public trust doctrine to 
issue a permit for offshore energy development.81 They also argued that 
even if the siting board did have authority, it violated its duties as a trustee 
by considering only the transmission lines in state waters, and not the 
entirety of the Cape Wind proposal.82 A divided court held that the siting 
board had public trust authority to approve offshore wind energy projects.83 
They also held that due diligence did not require review beyond the 
transmission lines themselves.84 Chief Justice Marshall issued a strongly 
worded dissent.85 The rationales issued by both the majority and the dissent 
reflects the doctrine’s three areas of legal uncertainty, discussed in the next 
section. 
 
IV. Unanswered Questions 
 
This section explores three indeterminate areas of public trust law. 
First, it explores the roles that different branches of government have in 
defining state public trust law. Second, it looks at how states administer 
fiduciary obligations. Public trust law prohibits states from granting an 
entire protected area if contrary to the public interest, and requires states to 
manage protected areas,86 but beyond this, courts provide little guidance to 
state trustees. Third, it examines what constitutes the public interest under 
the doctrine. Courts must clarify how conflicts between protected uses and 




                                                                                                                           
 80. See id. (“The siting board issued a tentative decision on May 11, 2009, and then a 
final decision granting the certificate on May 21, 2009.”). 
 81. See id. at 796 (“Each of the petitioners challenges the siting board's decision on 
several grounds, and the Alliance and Barnstable separately challenge the validity of a DEP 
regulation relevant to that decision . . . .”). 
 82. See id. at 803 (“The petitioners assert that . . . the siting board was obliged to 
assess the in-State impacts of the entire wind farm project in making its § 69K certificate 
decision.”). 
 83. See id. at 800–01 (“[U]nder the public trust doctrine, ‘only . . . an entity to which 
the Legislature properly has delegated authority, may administer public trust 
rights.’ . . . [W]here a tidelands license is necessary for a proposed facility, the Legislature 
has . . . expressly vested authority in the siting board to act in DEP’s stead.”). 
 84. See id. (discussing the authority of the siting board to review the project). 
 85. See id. at 816 (“Today’s decision . . . is contrary to existing law and seriously 
undermines the public trust doctrine, which for centuries has protected the rights of the 
people of Massachusetts in Commonwealth tidelands.”). 
 86. See Ill. Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (explaining the public 
trust doctrine and the right of states to use or dispose of public lands). 
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A.  Who Defines the Public Trust Doctrine? 
 
In Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. Energy Facilities Siting 
Board, the Board argued that they had public trust authority because of two 
statutes.87 In the first statute, the legislature charged the Department of 
Environmental Protection with “[serving] a public purpose [providing] a 
greater public benefit than public detriment to the rights of the public in 
said lands . . . .”88 
A later statute created the siting board, directing it “to stand in the 
shoes of any and all [s]tate and local agencies with [energy siting] 
permitting authority . . . .”89 Because the Department of Environmental 
Protection is among the agencies that the board can “stand in the shoes of,” 
the siting board argued that the second statute transferred public trust 
authority to them.90 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding the 
statutes taken together granted authority to the board.91 Chief Justice 
Marshall dissented, arguing, “[n]owhere in the commission’s charge did the 
Legislature address expressly, or by implication, public trust rights in the 
Commonwealth’s tidelands” to the Energy Facilities Siting Board.92 She 
reached this conclusion despite noting that the Massachusetts legislature 
created the Electric Power Plant Siting Commission with the authority to 
consider “the adequacy of existing state and municipal regulatory 
procedures to permit the furnishing of a sufficient supply of electric energy 
while . . . preserving and protecting land, air and water resources.”93 The 
Chief Justice sought an explicit reference to “tidelands, tidewaters, tidal 
flats, land under coastal waters, the public trust, or the traditional rights of 
navigation, fishing, and fowling” in order to find that the Siting Board had 
the requisite authority.94 Beyond requiring explicit grants of authority to 
administrative agencies, neither opinion suggests any limitations upon the 
                                                                                                                           
 87. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc., 932 N.E.2d at 800–01 (discussing 
whether the legislature had delegated public trust authority). 
 88. Id. at 800 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91 § 14). 
 89. Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164 § 69K). 
 90. See id. (stating that the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection is 
a state agency included in the statute). 
 91. See id. at 802 (“[W]e find in § 69K a sufficiently articulated legislative delegation 
of authority to the siting board to act in the place of DEP, and to administer the public trust 
rights within DEP’s jurisdiction.”). 
 92. Id. at 820 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 93. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 94. See id. at 821 (“The extensive legislative history . . . contains no reference to 
tidelands, tidewaters, tidal flats, land under coastal waters, the public trust, or the traditional 
rights of navigation, fishing, and fowling. . . . The silence is deafening.”). 
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legislature.95 
 
B.  How Should Trustees Administer Fiduciary Obligations? 
 
Under trust law, “[t]he fiduciary’s duties go beyond mere fairness 
and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary’s interests.”96 
Under public trust law, however, it remains unclear how trustees should 
administer obligations. 
One scholar stated that “heart of the public trust doctrine . . . is that 
it imposes limits and obligations on governments.”97 Elsewhere, courts 
emphasize a proactive approach. A Wisconsin court described the trust as 
requiring an active fiduciary: “[T]he legislature is fully vested with the 
power of control and regulation . . . . [The trust] requires the law-making 
body to act in all cases where action is necessary, not only to preserve the 
trust, but to promote it.”98 Other courts have urged the state to act even in 
the face of scientific uncertainty.99 
The Alliance opinion and its administrative antecedents do not 
overtly state whether the trust is a negative or positive obligation. The 
Supreme Judicial Court makes no mention of the doctrine being a positive 
obligation requiring proactive action to protect the public interest.100 The 
dissent suggests alternative energy is good policy,101 but normative values 
play no role in the reasoning. Chief Justice Marshall contends that the siting 
board cannot reasonably interpret statutory language obligating them with 
“preserving and protecting land, air and water resources” to implicate the 
public trust doctrine.102 By refusing to defer to the board’s interpretation, 
Chief Justice Marshall implies agencies should not pro-actively further the 
public interest.103 
                                                                                                                           
 95. See generally id. (failing to discuss limitations on legislative authority to define or 
administer the public trust). 
 96. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 882 (1988). 
 97. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 284 (1980). 
 98. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927). 
 99. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 427 (Haw. 2000) (“For the 
foreseeable future, it will be necessary to manage and protect streams through a system of 
working presumptions rather than on the basis of firm scientific knowledge.”). 
 100. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 811 (describing the 
limited scope of the siting board’s authority).’ 
 101. See id. at 816 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing 
that alternative energy development is vital, but projects must follow applicable law). 
 102. See id. at 820 (“Nowhere in the commission’s charge did the Legislature address 
expressly, or by implication, public trust rights in the Commonwealth’s tidelands.”). 
 103. See id. at 822 (“The siting board’s authority to grant a composite certificate is 
broad, but nothing in the statutory language, or its legislative history, indicates that such 
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Courts, recognizing the ambiguity of the doctrine, have alternately 
described the scope as “expanding” or “evolutionary.”104 An “expanding” 
doctrine risks rendering the doctrine’s bounds unknowable since courts 
have already expanded it to include areas ranging from streets to prehistoric 
fossil beds, and to include uses as diverse as aesthetic enjoyment and 
cultural considerations.105 As Huffman warned: “[I]f a public right to fish 
implies a public right to camp and a navigable waterway implies a prairie 
pothole . . . then there can be no rule of law because there is no bounded 
concept to constrain the judge.”106 Further, expansion implies continuous 
growth.107 What if the public interest requires contraction? 
The doctrine has also been described as “evolutionary” or 
“flexible” and subject to changing public needs: “The public trust doctrine, 
like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static but 
should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of 
the public it was created to benefit.”108 Though the “evolutionary” view 
allows for both expansion and contraction, there is no clear path forward. 
States, citizens, and courts may disagree about how the doctrine should 
evolve.109 
Rather than an expanding or evolving doctrine, courts can also 
balance competing values. A California court allowed offshore oil and gas 
development only if: 
 
[T]he board first found that the particular lands are not 
required and with reasonable certainty will not be required 
for a period of twenty-five years for the promotion of 
commerce, navigation or fishing. The section also provides 
that money derived . . . shall be used exclusively for 
improvement and maintenance of the harbor.110 
                                                                                                                 
authority encompasses the power to act with respect to public trust rights.”). 
 104. See Timothy Patrick Brady, Note, But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born: 
The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
621, 631 (1990) (stating that courts have made a wide use of the public trust doctrine in a 
variety of disputes). 
 105. See id. at 631–32 (discussing the expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond 
navigable waters and the shorelines to city streets, municipal water supplies, a prehistoric 
fossil bed, an inland state park, an inland national part, and inland wetlands). 
 106. Huffman, supra note 40, at 96. 
 107. See Brady, supra note 104, at 631–32 (discussing the increasing use of the public 
trust doctrine). 
 108. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 
1972). 
 109. See Brady, supra note 104, at 631–33 (discussing the criticisms of the modern 
public trust doctrine). 
 110. City of Long Beach v. Marshall, 82 P.2d 362, 364 (Cal. 1938). 
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In that case, the doctrine did not expand or evolve to preserve 
offshore oil and gas.111 The court instead balanced competing values: 
protection of public uses, protection of natural resources, and energy 
development.112 
All three approaches to the doctrine can hypothetically involve a 
state considering the effects upon one individual resource, or upon all state 
resources collectively. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,113 
the California high court held that the state may consider state resources in 
their totality.114 The Massachusetts high court decided Alliance on narrow 
grounds and did not firmly state whether “in-state impacts” referred to 
impacts on Nantucket Sound or protected areas throughout the state.115 The 
dissent noted the importance of transitioning to alternative sources of 
energy, but only mentioned harm to Nantucket Sound.116 
 
C.  What Constitutes the Public Interest? 
 
The public trust doctrine requires states to act in the public interest, 
but definitions of public interest are unclear. The Illinois Central Court 
defined public use as the public interest: “[States may] use or 
dispose . . . [of resources only] when that can be done without substantial 
impairment of interest of the public in the waters . . . .”117 The Court went 
on to state that, “[the resources are] held in trust for the people of the State 
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have the liberty of fishing . . . .”118 The Court also noted that 
some public uses, especially navigation and commerce, were prioritized 
over others. 119 
                                                                                                                           
 111. See id. at 365 (discussing the established law concerning ownership of tidelands). 
 112. See generally id. (ensuring that the state’s duty to public uses, natural resources, 
and energy were all fulfilled). 
 113.  658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 114. See id. at 727 (discussing the interrelationship between the Public Trust Doctrine 
and the California Water Rights System). 
 115. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 
N.E.2d 787, 806 (Mass. 2010) (“We emphasize that the siting board properly could, and did, 
consider the in-State impacts of the entire length of Cape Wind’s transmission lines even 
though the lines will lie in part in Federal waters because those impacts relate directly to the 
‘facility’ over which the siting board has jurisdiction.”). 
 116. See id. at 816–25 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the legislature’s goal to ensure that state and municipal regulatory procedures 
“balance the need for sufficient electric energy with environmental protection, public health 
and public safety”). 
 117. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
 118. Id. at 452. 
 119. See id. at 457 (“The land remained subject to all other public uses as before, 
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In Alliance, the majority said that “[the public trust doctrine] 
expresses the government’s long-standing and firmly established obligation 
to protect the public’s interest in the tidelands and, in particular, to protect 
the public’s right to use the tidelands ‘for, traditionally, fishing, fowling, 
and navigation.’”120 The dissent countered that the doctrine represents 
“[c]enturies of legislation and jurisprudence concerning the paramount 
rights of the people of the Commonwealth to the use of the sea and 
shore.”121 The dissent went on to state that “[n]owhere in the commission’s 
charge did the Legislature address expressly, or by implication, public trust 
rights in the Commonwealth’s tidelands.”122 
Other times, courts have emphasized the resources themselves. The 
California Supreme Court stated that, 
 
there is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed 
within the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those 
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and 
marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and 
climate of the area.123 
 
In upholding a county ban on recreational watercraft, the 
Washington Supreme Court found that it did not interfere with the public 
use of waters, stating that, “it would be an odd use of the public trust 
doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters 
and wildlife of this state.”124 
In Alliance, though both opinions define the public interest as 
public use, neither opinion mentions specific examples of the turbines or 
transmission lines interfering with public uses.125 In fact, “[t]he site at 
Horseshoe Shoals is not considered an important commercial fishery; it is 
not listed as important habitat for any rare marine species, and it is not 
                                                                                                                 
especially to those of navigation and commerce, which are always paramount to those of 
public fisheries.”). 
 120. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 799 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Moot v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 861 N.E2d 410, 412 (Mass. 2007). 
 121. Id. at 817 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 122. Id. at 820. 
 123. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971). 
 124. Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 285 (Wash. 1998). 
 125. See generally Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d 787 (failing to 
discuss instances where wind power projects interfere with public land and water uses). 
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located within a busy navigational channel.”126 Perhaps, then, the court’s 
true concern is with resources rather than with public uses. 
 
V. Moving Forward 
 
Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall states in her 
dissent that “[t]he public trust doctrine and government energy policy are 
not at odds. Indeed, they are complementary. Both express the people’s 
paramount interest in the wise and fruitful use of natural resources. Today’s 
opinion, however, casts these two allies in opposition, and exalts regulatory 
expediency at the cost of fiduciary obligation.”127 The public trust doctrine 
and energy policy should be complementary. The conflict in Alliance, 
however, was the result of ambiguity that existed long before anyone 
conceived of offshore wind energy.128 
The public trust doctrine protected and preserved vital coastal and 
offshore resources for two hundred years, but it now endangers those same 
resources. This section reconciles the doctrine’s ambiguity by proposing 
answers to the three questions raised above. Without resolving these areas 
of ambiguity, state obligations, public rights, and court interpretations will 
remain indeterminate. 
 
A.  Three Underlying Assumptions for Fulfilling Public Trust Duties 
1. Legislatures and Administrative Agencies Should Have Broad 
Interpretive Discretion, But Courts Must Establish and Enforce Limits. 
Within the broad boundaries of Illinois Central, the Court allowed 
states to define the public trust doctrine but did not clearly demarcate the 
roles of the different branches of government.129 
The legislature is most able to consider the public interest.130 Courts 
must allow for legislative discretion so the doctrine can develop with the 
public interest. The trust is an intermediary between a state and its 
citizens.131 Surely then, a legislature cannot have unlimited capacity to 
                                                                                                                           
 126. Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 68, at 201. 
 127. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 825 (Marshall, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 128. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 803 (discussing the role that the Illinois 
Central decision plays in creating ambiguities in the public trust doctrine). 
 129. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (defining the terms of 
the public trust doctrine). 
 130. See Sax, supra note 3, at 551 (stating that the task of addressing the public interest 
is essentially one for the legislature). 
 131. See id. at 477 (discussing the trustee relationship between the state and its 
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define the doctrine or it would become as broad as the state police power, 
making it redundant.132 Courts must therefore establish and enforce limits to 
legislative discretion. 
Environmental law relies on administrative agencies for 
implementation.133 Legislatures must grant fiduciary authority to agencies. 
Agencies, as experts, should have wide latitude to interpret enabling 
statutes. For the same reasons as the legislature, courts must establish 
limits. 
 
2. Trustees Must Actively Promote the Public Interest by Balancing Costs 
and Harms to All State Resources. 
 
Private fiduciary duties require trustees “to act to further the 
beneficiary’s best interests.”134 Unless the name of the doctrine is 
hyperbole, public trustees must be able to serve the public interest.135 In 
order to properly empower trustees to pursue the public interest, the 
doctrine must be both a positive right to create benefits, and a negative right 
to avoid harm.136 
Courts sometimes describe the doctrine’s scope as an expanding 
doctrine, implying continual expansion to more protected areas and uses.137 
In certain cases, however, the public interest may require contraction.138 
Others view the doctrine as evolutionary or flexible, subject to changing 
public needs.139 States, citizens, and courts may disagree about the 
                                                                                                                 
citizens). 
 132. See id. (differentiating the public trust authority from more expansive forms of 
state power). 
 133. See, e.g., Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCYPA.GOV (June 3, 
2013), http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ (describing the EPA’s mission and role in implantation 
of federal environmental laws). 
 134. See DeMott, supra note 96, at 882 (explaining the general principles of fiduciary 
obligations). 
 135. See id. (stating that a trustee’s duty to “act to further the beneficiary’s best 
interests” implies that those trustees serving the public should work to satisfy the public’s 
best interests). 
 136. See Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 563, 604–05 (2001) (describing both the positive and negative 
rights within the public trust doctrine). 
 137. See Brady, supra note 104, at 631 (listing several instances where courts have 
applied the public trust doctrine in an expansive way). 
 138. See id. at 632–33 (addressing criticisms of courts’ expansive use of the public trust 
doctrine). 
 139. See e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
55 (N.J. 1972) (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions 
and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”). 
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doctrine’s evolutionary path, however.140 
Rather than an expanding or evolving doctrine, courts should 
balance competing values. A balancing approach would allow states to 
consider resources in total rather than individually.141 
3. The Doctrine’s Primary Interest is the Protection of Natural Resources. 
The public trust doctrine requires states to act in the public interest, 
but the definition of “public interest” is unclear.142 Sometimes, courts 
define the public interest as protecting both public use of natural resources 
and protection of the resources themselves.143 Other times, courts 
emphasize one over the other.144 
Public uses cannot exist without natural resources.145 If offshore 
waters disappear, no public use of the waters is possible. Conversely, 
natural resources can exist without public uses. If no one fishes, fowls, or 
navigates on offshore waters, those resources will not disappear. Thus, all 
else being equal, resource preservation should take priority. 
 
B.  Six Proposed Requirements for Fulfilling Public Trust Duties 
 
State actions risking harm to a protected resource or a protected use 
presumptively violate the public trust doctrine.146 The Alliance opinion 
interprets the doctrine to require only legal authority and due diligence.147 
This section expands upon those requirements and then proposes four 
additional requirements. 
                                                                                                                           
 140. See Zachary C. Kliensasser, note, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory 
and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV., 421, 433 
(2005) (noting where authorities disagree on the evolution of the public trust doctrine). 
 141. See Sax, supra note 3, at 517 (noting that the court in Public Service Commission 
balanced the provision of a “more substantial bathing beach and better park facilities” with 
fish production and the effect on navigation). 
 142. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 703 (1986) 
(acknowledging that public interest as applied in the public trust doctrine is a vague notion). 
 143. See generally MICHAEL BLUMM ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THIRTY-
SEVEN STATES (2013) (surveying the use of the public trust doctrine in thirty-seven states). 
 144. See generally id. (illustrating the various ways that the courts of thirty-seven states 
apply the public trust doctrine). 
 145. See Lazarus, supra note 142, at 632 (noting that the public trust doctrine rests on 
“the notion that the public possesses inviolable rights in certain natural resources”). 
 146. See Sax, supra note 3, at 500–01 (citing a case in which a court was skeptical of 
administrative discretion over the public use of wetlands because of a recent law 
emphasizing the protection of “water resources, fish and wildlife”). 
 147. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 
N.E.2d 787, 800 (Mass. 2010) (stating that under the public trust doctrine, only the state, or 
an entity to which the state has delegated authority, can “administer public trust rights”). 
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1. State Fiduciaries Must Have Legal Authority. 
A grant of public trust authority prevents agencies from acting 
without authority, but gives legislatures discretion to delegate.148 
Legislative language enabling agencies to “[preserve and protect] land, air 
and water resources”149 adequately grants trust authority. 
2. State Fiduciaries Must Exercise Due Diligence in Determining if Actions 
Are in the Public Interest. 
In Alliance, the justices disagreed about whether the siting board 
exercised due diligence.150 Under the doctrine, states must examine the risk 
of harmful impacts.151 Due diligence requires open decision-making.152 This 
requirement places a limitation upon legislative and administrative 
discretion, lest public resources or uses be given over to private interests.153 
3. State Fiduciaries Must Mitigate Harm. 
To the extent possible, states must mitigate harm. In response to the 
opposition, Cape Wind changed locations and reduced the number of 
turbines.154 Cape Wind sited the project so it was barely visible from the 
shore.155 The site was also selected so as to not interfere with navigation, 
sensitive animal species, or commercial fishing.156 
                                                                                                                           
 148. See id. (internal quotations omitted) (“[U]nder the public trust doctrine, only the 
Commonwealth or an entity to which the Legislature has properly delegated authority, may 
administer public trust rights.”). 
 149. See id. at 820 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing 
the legislature’s grant of authority to the Electric Power Plant Siting Commission). 
 150. See id. at 816–25 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that, contrary to the majority’s finding, the siting board did not conduct adequate 
due diligence). 
 151. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“[S]overeignty over lands 
covered by tide waters . . . belong to the respective States within which they are found, with 
the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without 
substantial impairment of the interest of the public.”). 
 152. See Sax, supra note 3, at 564 (emphasizing the importance of a public record in 
agency decision-making regarding public trust resources). 
 153. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 817 (Marshall, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The public trust doctrine stands as a covenant 
between the people of the Commonwealth and their government, a covenant to safeguard our 
tidelands for all generations for the use of the people.”). 
 154. See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 68, at 209 (noting that the Cape Wind 
Project reduced the number of turbines from 170 to 130 and modified the location of some to 
preserve the view from historic sites). 
 155. See id. (describing the visibility of wind turbines from points of interest along the 
Cape). 
 156. See id. at 201 (explaining that the site of the wind turbines “is not considered an 
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4. State Fiduciaries Must Continuously Manage Protected Resources and 
Uses. 
Under Illinois Central, states cannot forgo their duty to supervise 
protected resources or uses.157 The Court commented: “The control of the 
state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels 
as are used in promoting the interests of the public . . . .”158 This is true even 
where the state grants use of the land to municipalities or other entities.159 
5. State Action that Risks or Causes Substantial Harm to a Protected 
Resource Must Be Outweighed By Benefits to the Entire State’s Resources. 
This constraint gives meaning to the public trust doctrine. Without 
resource preservation being the paramount public interest, the doctrine 
becomes redundant.160 The constraint prevents an action that largely 
eliminates a public resource (e.g., a waterfront turned into a railroad).161 
States must balance competing considerations and avoid action if the 
benefits do not clearly outweigh the costs.162 
Under this analysis, the doctrine prohibits offshore oil rigs and 
nuclear plants because they cause substantial harm to protected resources 
without a corresponding benefit to other resources.163 Offshore wind 
turbines also cause harm to a protected resource, but they mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions, and in doing so, benefit other resources.164 
                                                                                                                 
important commercial fishery; it is not listed as important habitat for any rare marine 
species, and it is not located within a busy navigational channel”). 
 157. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (“The State can no more 
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable 
waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration 
of government and the preservation of the peace.”). 
 158. Id. at 453. 
 159. See id. (discussing the limited ability of the state to grant to other parties public 
trust lands and resources). 
 160. See Lazarus, supra note 142, at 632 (emphasizing the importance of natural 
resource preservation in the public trust doctrine). 
 161. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (explaining that the state cannot “substantially 
impair” the public interests under the public trust doctrine). 
 162. See Sax, supra note 3, at 561–65 (arguing that courts should evaluate 
administrative and legislative decisions on public trust issues by balancing public and private 
interests). 
 163. See Hope M. Babcock, A Risky Business: A Generation of Nuclear Power and 
Deepwater Drilling for Offshore Oil and Gas, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 64–66 (2012) 
(addressing current hesitancy towards nuclear power and offshore drilling as a result of 
recent disasters); Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 817 (Marshall, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A wind farm today may be a drilling rig or 
nuclear power plant tomorrow.”). 
 164. See Klass, supra note 10, at 1064–65 (endorsing modern renewable energy 
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6. State Action that Risks or Causes Substantial Harm to a Protected Public 
Use Must Be Outweighed By Benefits to Protected Resources or the Public 
Interest Generally. 
The public trust doctrine has always prioritized certain public uses 
over others, particularly navigation.165 Legislatures and agencies should 
have wide discretion to regulate the use of a resource. While the law 
recognizes de facto uses like navigation and fishing, legislatures and 
agencies have discretion to regulate to preserve natural resources or better 
serve the public interest.166 The risk to public uses is already minimal 




Many scholars argue that the public trust doctrine and other 
environmental laws must adapt for climate change.167 The problem, though, 
is one of uncertainty rather than unwillingness. Ambiguity creates several 
reasonable but competing interpretations of how the law should adapt. 
Some scholars argue that the severity of climate change warrants an 
“any means necessary” approach allowing any state action that mitigates or 
adapts to climate change.168 This approach, however, wrongly presumes 
                                                                                                                 
projects based on the public trust values they promote). 
 165. See In re Trempealeau Drainage Dist., 131 N.W. 838, 841–42 (Wis. 1911) 
(holding that navigation can be improved even if fishing is substantially damaged); City of 
Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 832 (Wis. 1927) (holding that a harbor could be built 
despite harming fishing and recreation because it improved navigation). 
 166. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 932 N.E.2d at 800 (internal quotation 
omitted) (“The public trust doctrine expresses the government’s long-standing and firmly 
established obligation to protect the public’s interest in the tidelands and, in particular, to 
protect the public’s right to use the tidelands for, traditionally, fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.”). 
 167. See generally David D. Caron, Time and the Public Trust Doctrine: Law’s 
Knowledge of Climate Change, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 411 (2013) (discussing the public trust 
doctrine’s adaptation to climate change); Laura Householder, Have We All Gone Batty? The 
Need for a Better Balance Between the Conservation of Protected Species and the 
Development of Clean Renewable Energy, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. POL’Y REV. 807 (2011) 
(discussing the public trust doctrine’s use in renewable energy development). 
 168. See Nagle, supra note 58, at 90 (noting that people under this approach believe 
“that climate change presents such an overwhelming threat that drastic actions are justified 
to avoid it”); Householder, supra note 167, at 820 (“While it is important to encourage 
renewable energy development, it is imperative that Congress enable the most 
environmentally friendly forms to succeed.”); David M. Driesen, Exempting Climate 
Mitigation from OIRA Review, REGBLOG (Jan. 24, 2013), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/01/24-driesen-climate-mitigation.html 
(suggesting that the Obama Administration should take on climate change aggressively) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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that we know the means by which to mitigate climate change.169 Moreover, 
environmental law rarely takes such an approach.170 As with the public trust 
doctrine, courts weigh environmental values against each other171 and 
against non-environmental values.172 Other scholars suggest the opposite, 
arguing that environmental values should be balanced against all other 
societal values in one all-encompassing balancing test.173 That balancing, 
however, compounds the problem by introducing more amorphous values 
with no predictable way to weigh them. 
If environmental law is to continue serving the public interest, it 
must expressly define and incorporate more than just environmental values. 
Doing so in a consistent way will inform states and private parties of their 
obligations, and citizens of their rights. 
Sustainable development provides a means of clarifying 
environmental law. As one scholar describes it: 
 
During the past twenty years . . . an increasing number of 
law firms, public officials, and scholars [view] 
environmental, land use, real estate, energy, and other 
related fields of law as an integrated area of practice and 
scholarship . . . . [This serves as] a unifying concept that 
provides the insights and strategies needed to address the 
nation’s heightened concern over climate change.174 
 
Sustainable development recognizes that resources are finite, and 
that states must base decisions on the needs of both current and succeeding 
generations.175 Sustainable development explicitly balances environmental, 
                                                                                                                           
 169. See generally Clara Deser et al., Uncertainty in Climate Change Projections: The 
Role of Internal Variability, 38 CLIM. DYN. 527 (2012) (discussing the lack of certainty in 
the climate change projections on the concrete effects of climate change). 
 170. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2014) (“[T]he 
Federal Government shall utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure 
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in 
planning and in decision making which may have an impact on man’s environment.”). 
 171. See Nagle, supra note 58, at 102–04 (explaining how courts balance public interest 
decisions). 
 172. See Carstens v. California Coastal Comm’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 135, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (“We find nothing in article X, section 4 to preclude the Commission from 
considering commerce as well as recreational and environmental needs in carrying out the 
public trust doctrine.”). 
 173. See Nagle, supra note 58 at 103 (“If balancing is to be done, it should place all of 
the factors on the scale . . . .”). 
 174. John R. Nolon, Shifting Paradigms Transform Environmental and Land Use Law: 
The Emergence of the Law of Sustainable Development, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 242, 
245 (2013). 
 175. See GRO H. BRUNTLAND, OUR COMMON FUTURE: THE WORLD COMMISSION ON 
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economic, and social values.176 Thus, a shift towards a sustainability model 
would allow for a balancing of specific economic and social values from 
within the law itself, rather than as elements of an amorphous public 
interest.177 
Will environmental law continue to protect natural resources for 
current and future generations? Or will it cease being a coherent body of 
law? The public test doctrine, perhaps the oldest environmental law, serves 
as the test case. 
                                                                                                                 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 43 (1987) (explaining that sustainable development 
should “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs”). 
 176. See generally JOAN FITZGERALD & MICHAEL J. MOTTA, CITIES AND 
SUSTAINABILITY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CITIES AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012) 
(discussing the purpose and goals of sustainable development). 
 177. See BRUNTLAND, supra note 178, at 43 (arguing that sustainability cannot be 
achieved without policies that consider costs and benefits). 
